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CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTALISM AND 
THE CONSTRUCTED COMMONS 
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The public domain is to the world of innovation and creativity what the 
environment is to the physical world. Concern with the public’s ability to build 
upon a body of intellectual works that are freely available as raw material for 
new generations of creativity and innovation echoes environmentalists’ concern 
with the public’s ability to enjoy healthy air, water, and open spaces. Skepticism 
about expanding intellectual property rights that impoverish the public domain 
echoes environmentalists’ skepticism about strong tangible property rights that 
limit the public’s access to open spaces and threaten to derail regulation aimed 
at protecting natural resources.1 In the work that this symposium 
commemorates and builds upon, James Boyle recognized these parallels and 
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 1. Compare, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38 (Winter/Spring 2003) (“The old limits to 
intellectual property rights—the anti-erosion walls around the public domain—are . . . under attack.”), 
with Joseph L. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 715, 715 (2002) (“My subject is how a quarter century of development in environmental 
protection is jeopardized by ill-conceived legislative proposals that purport to protect property 
rights.”). 
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called for the emergence of “cultural environmentalism”—a politics of public 
domain protection analogous to the politics of environmental protection.2 
Ten years later, advocates for the value of open access to cultural raw 
materials are borrowing not just the politics of the environmental movement, 
but also specific techniques that environmentalists have used to protect 
important natural resources. Ironically, in both the physical and cultural 
contexts, environmentalists are increasingly harnessing property rights—so 
often in apparent tension with environmental goals—to promote the public’s 
interest in protecting and providing access to important resources.3 
One way this phenomenon has emerged in the physical world is in the form 
of non-possessory property interests called “conservation easements.”4 A 
landowner who sells or donates a conservation easement, typically to a 
government entity or a non-profit organization devoted to conservation, 
remains in possession of her land but is required, along with successive owners, 
 
 2. Boyle called for a politics of the public domain in SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 168–73 (1996). In A Politics of Intellectual 
Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 108–14 (1997), he repeated the call and 
added an analogy to the environmental movement. 
 3. On “property thinking in environmental law,” see generally Carol M. Rose, The Several 
Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folktales, Emissions Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
129, 163 (1998) (“In spite of [the traditional] strain of skepticism about property within 
environmentalism, the last several years have seen an astonishing burst of property thinking in 
environmental law.”). 
On the historic tension between property law and environmental goals, see generally CAROL M. 
ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 19–20 (1994) (“To be sure, we may admire nature and enjoy 
wildness.  But those sentiments find little resonance in the doctrine of first possession.  Its texts are 
those of cultivation, manufacture, and development.”); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the 
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 
1442 (1993) (“Traditional property law treats undeveloped land as essentially inert. The land is there, it 
may have things on or in it (e.g., timber or coal), but it is in a passive state, waiting to be put to use. 
Insofar as land is ‘doing’ something—for example, harboring wild animals—property law considers 
such functions expendable.”); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 
79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 816 (1994) (arguing that one specific property doctrine, adverse possession, is 
“dominated by a prodevelopment nineteenth century ideology that encourages and legitimates 
economic exploitation—and thus environmental degradation—of wild lands.”). 
On the use of property rights to protect the public domain in intellectual property, see generally 
Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 185–86 (2004); R. 
Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1029–33 (2003). 
On the tension between the public domain and intellectual property, see generally Boyle, supra 
note 2, at 111 (observing that in both environmental policy and intellectual property “opposition to 
expansionist versions of stakeholders’ rights can be off-puttingly portrayed as a stand against private 
property”). 
 4. Other examples of property-based environmental protection include tradable emissions 
schemes, which have been deployed to control air pollution. Similar tradable-rights approaches have 
been used or proposed to deal with water pollution, fisheries management, and other problems of 
pollution, resource conservation, and habitat preservation. See generally Peter S. Menell, Introduction 
to ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at xiii–xx (Peter S. Menell ed., 2002) (surveying literature); James Salzman 
& J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN L. REV. 607, 609–10 
(2000) (surveying developments and observing that “[m]arkets for environmental commodities 
represent the new wave of environmental protection and, despite critiques both subtle and shrill, they 
are still building”). 
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to use the land only in ways that are consistent with the terms of the easement.5 
For example, a conservation easement might require that land be maintained as 
a wildlife habitat, or that it be open for outdoor recreation by the public, or that 
it be preserved as open space, free of buildings that might interfere with the 
public’s scenic enjoyment of an area. The goal is to promote specific 
conservation purposes6 by severing the right to possess land from the right to 
use it in ways that disserve those purposes. 
In the cultural context, advocates for a rich and expanding public domain 
are increasingly deploying voluntary intellectual-property-based techniques to 
achieve their goals.7 Most notable to date have been the efforts of the Free 
Software Foundation (FSF) to promote the use of the GNU General Public 
License (GPL), a software license that allows free copying and adaptation of 
copyrighted computer software, but only on the condition that resulting copies 
and adaptations are licensed on the same generous terms and accompanied by 
their source code.8 Thousands of software programs, including the Linux 
operating system, are licensed under the GPL.9 Recently, the nonprofit Creative 
Commons has promoted similar licenses for other types of creative works—
photos, film, music, et cetera.10 
In essence, these licenses separate the right to copy and adapt copyrighted 
works from the right to exclude others from the benefits of further copying and 
adaptation—much as conservation easements separate the right to possess and 
enjoy land from the right to deny the public its potential conservation benefits. 
Although works covered by the GPL or Creative Commons licenses are not 
technically in the public domain (at least as narrowly defined to include only 
those works that are not subject to any intellectual-property-based 
 
 5. See generally ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION 
EASEMENT HANDBOOK 14–25 (2005). 
 6. For purposes of identifying those conservation easements that qualify a donor for beneficial tax 
treatment, the Internal Revenue Code defines “conservation purposes” to include “the preservation of 
land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the general public”; “the protection of a 
relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem”; “the preservation of open 
space (including farmland and forest land) where such preservation is—for the scenic enjoyment of the 
general public, or pursuant to a clearly defined Federal, State, or local governmental conservation 
policy, and will yield a significant public benefit”; or “the preservation of an historically important land 
area or a certified historic structure.” I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) (2000). 
 7. See generally Merges, supra note 3, at 183–84 (observing that “we have been witnessing massive 
growth in private initiatives to expand the public domain”); Wagner, supra note 3, at 1029–33 (“To the 
extent that the control of intellectual property allows owners to coordinate the uses of their works to 
restrict access, it also enables those owners to coordinate in such a way as to enhance access.”). 
 8. Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License v. 2, 1991, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html [hereinafter GNU General Public License]. GNU stands for 
“Gnu’s Not Unix,” the software project with which Richard Stallman launched the free software 
movement.  See Richard Stallman, The GNU Manifesto, http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 9. A search for GPL-licensed projects on the software development site Freshmeat currently 
yields over 22,000 projects. Freshmeat, http://freshmeat.net/browse/15/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 10. Creative Commons, “Some Rights Reserved”: Building a Layer of Reasonable Copyright, 
http://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
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restrictions),11 they are available to the public for many uses that copyright law 
would otherwise forbid, just as works covered by conservation easements may 
be open to the public—or at least dedicated to purposes that ultimately benefit 
the public—in ways that private property typically is not.12 
Conservation easements have been praised for “conform[ing] to the general 
American desire for non-compulsory, voluntary solutions to land use 
problems . . . .”13 Efforts to harness intellectual property rights to promote open 
access to creative and innovative works have similarly been lauded as 
“invigorating the public domain with a new dynamism stemming from private 
action.”14 But there have long been critics of conservation easements,15 and the 
recent property turn in cultural environmentalism has begun to encounter 
criticism of its own.16 
Conservation easements typically violate several common-law rules 
governing the formation and enforceability of non-possessory interests in land. 
Although the common-law obstacles have been eliminated by state statutes 
authorizing conservation easements, some critics have challenged the wisdom of 
those statutory authorizations, arguing that the common-law rules served 
important purposes. Two justifications for the common-law rules are central to 
this discussion: first, ensuring notice to future landowners and affected third 
parties; and second, preserving the flexibility necessary to make wise resource-
use decisions in the future. These justifications resonate, more generally, with a 
growing literature praising standardization and consolidation of property 
rights.17 Conservation easements—which complicate and fragment property 
 
 11. On the question how to define the public domain, see Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital 
Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 12. On the mix of motives and benefits associated with conservation easements, see generally 
Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2526–27 (2006) (“Conservation servitudes . . . are designed to serve primarily 
public ends. They are used to protect the environment and historic land uses and structures from the ills 
caused by logging and resource extraction and by urban and suburban development. The values 
promoted are protection of life and health for people, plants, and wildlife. They protect historical and 
cultural resources as well as natural resources for enjoyment by future generations.”). 
 13. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Conservation 
Easement Act Summary, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-ucea.asp 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Uniform Conservation Easement Act Summary]. 
 14. Merges, supra note 3, at 184. 
 15. See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the 
Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984). 
 16. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005). 
 17. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 773, 800 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface]; Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle]; 
Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 621, 666 (1998). 
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rights in land—are in tension with those ideals. Critics argue that the GPL and 
Creative Commons licenses are as well.18 
This article considers these tools of cultural environmentalism in light of 
objections to conservation easements and more general concerns with 
complicated and fragmented property rights. It concludes that the cultural 
context does present problems analogous to those encountered by conservation 
easements, but that the problems stem in large part from the background law of 
copyright. The lessons gleaned from the conservation easement experience can 
usefully be applied to improve and shape the future development of the GPL 
and Creative Commons licenses. But they might also help to solve some of the 
problems caused by copyright law itself. 
II 
LAND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
Conservation easements are non-possessory property rights typically held by 
government entities or by charitable organizations called “land trusts.”19 There 
are over 1600 land trusts operating in the United States,20 including well-known 
national organizations like the Nature Conservancy21 and the Trust for Public 
Land.22 When a landowner sells or donates a conservation easement to one of 
these organizations, the landowner maintains possession of the land but must 
use it only in ways that are consistent with the terms of the easement. As 
William Whyte, an early proponent of conservation easements pithily 
explained, “what we do is buy away from the owner his right to louse [the 
property] up.”23 
A conservation easement might provide, for example, that the covered land 
“shall be used only for conservation and for noncommercial outdoor recreation 
 
 18. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 407–22; see also discussion infra notes 94–97 and 
accompanying text. 
 19. The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines a “conservation easement” as 
a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative 
obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-
space values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or 
open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or 
preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property. 
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), available at http://www.cals.ncsu.edu/wq/ 
LandPreservationNotebook/PDFDocuments/uniform.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.6 (2000) (defining “conservation servitude”). 
 20. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT (2006), available at 
http://www.lta.org/census/2005_report.pdf. 
 21. The Nature Conservancy, About the Nature Conservancy, http://www.nature.org/aboutus (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2007) (“The Nature Conservancy is the leading conservation organization working to 
protect the most ecologically important lands and waters around the world for nature and people.”). 
 22. The Trust for Public Land, About TPL, http://www.tpl.org/tier2_sa.cfm?folder_id=170 (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2007) (“The Trust for Public Land (TPL) is a national, nonprofit, land conservation 
organization that conserves land for people to enjoy as parks, community gardens, historic sites, rural 
lands, and other natural places, ensuring livable communities for generations to come.”). 
 23. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE (1968), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL WILLIAM 
H. WHYTE 159, 161 (Albert LaFarge ed., 2000). 
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by the general public,” or that no “industrial, mining, or commercial activities, 
and no residential or other building development are permitted.”24 These 
limitations run with the land, binding not only the landowner but her successors 
in interest as well.25 The land trust or other entity that holds the easement has 
the right to enforce its terms.26 
Landowners have been crafting conservation easements in the United States 
since the late nineteenth century,27 but their use has exploded in recent years. 
As of the Land Trust Alliance’s 2005 census, over six million acres of land in the 
United States were covered by conservation easements—almost 1.5 times the 
acreage protected just five years earlier.28 
Part of the growth in the use of conservation easements is likely due to 
increased certainty about their legal validity.29 Until the second half of the 
twentieth century, the meaning and enforceability of conservation easements 
was unclear in many states. The common law governing servitudes imposed a 
number of limitations that conservation easements typically violated.30 Most 
important, the common law disfavored servitudes whose benefits were “in 
gross” (as opposed to “appurtenant”), meaning that their benefits did not 
attach to or “touch and concern” a dominant estate in land.31 Conservation 
 
 24. This is boilerplate language provided in BYERS & PONTE, supra note 5, at 322. 
 25. This is a fundamental feature of “servitudes,” the category of non-possessory property rights 
that includes conservation easements, other types of easements, real covenants, and equitable 
servitudes. A servitude is defined by the current Restatement as “a legal device that creates a right or 
an obligation that runs with land or an interest in land.” “Running with land means that the right or 
obligation passes automatically to successive owners or occupiers of the land or the interest in land with 
which the right or obligation runs.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 (2000). 
 26. See generally BYERS & PONTE, supra note 5, at 156 (“An easement holder must be ready to 
both enforce the terms of the easement’s restrictions and defend an easement if the landowner sues to 
challenge it.”); Land Trust Alliance, What is a Conservation Easement?, http://www.lta.org/ 
conserve/easement.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (“When you donate a conservation easement to a 
land trust, you give up some of the rights associated with the land. For example, you might give up the 
right to build additional structures, while retaining the right to grow crops. Future owners also will be 
bound by the easement’s terms. The land trust is responsible for making sure the easement’s terms are 
followed.”). 
 27. Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary Actions, and 
Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE 9, 9 (2000) (identifying the first American conservation easement, “written in the late 1880s to 
protect the parkways in and around Boston designed by renowned landscape architect Frederick Law 
Olmstead”); see also 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.02 (Michael A. 
Wolf ed., 2000) (“Use of easements to preserve sensitive lands and scenic views dates back more than 
one hundred years.”); WHYTE, supra note 23, at 164 (noting that the easement “is an ancient [device], 
and its application to conservation goes back many years”). 
 28. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 20, at 5, 15. 
 29. The conservation easement movement has also been spurred by tax policy, including a 
provision of the Internal Revenue Code that makes the value of a donated easement tax deductible. 
I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), 170(h) (2000). 
 30. POWELL, supra note 27, § 34A.02[3] (noting that the “absence of a firm statutory foundation 
for these easements had left the precise meaning of the property interests they conferred somewhat 
unclear”). 
 31. See Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 2, 14 (1989) (“Conservation easements held by land trusts are almost invariably held in 
gross . . . . Thus, at common law, conservation easements would be neither transferable nor perpetual in 
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easements typically are in gross, because they give their benefit—that is, the 
right to limit development—to a governmental entity or conservation-oriented 
non-profit organization without regard to that recipient’s ownership of land.32 
Beginning in the 1950s, proponents of conservation easements advocated 
statutory reform to overcome the obstacles imposed by the common law.33 
States began adopting legislation authorizing conservation easements in the late 
1950s and early 1960s,34 a movement that was later encouraged and standardized 
to some extent by the 1981 promulgation of the Uniform Conservation 
Easement Act (UCEA). The Act “enables durable restrictions and affirmative 
obligations to be attached to real property to protect natural and historic 
resources. Under the conditions spelled out in the Act, the restrictions and 
obligations are immune from certain common-law impediments which might 
otherwise be raised.”35 Every U.S. state has now adopted either the UCEA or 
similar legislation authorizing conservation easements.36 
By sweeping away arcane common-law distinctions and limitations, these 
statutory changes have helped the conservation easement movement flourish, 
allowing thousands of landowners voluntarily to partner with government and 
non-profit organizations to serve the public interest in conservation. 
Conservation easements have been praised as “contribut[ing] to a truly 
revolutionary environmental ethic in which landowners willingly protect the 
environment on their lands,”37 and as “a means for protecting and preserving 
ecological diversity, open space, and other environmental qualities on private 
lands without relying on government regulation.”38 
III 
CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTALISM’S PROPERTY TURN 
Like the environmentalists who have championed conservation easements, 
some activists who worry about the negative implications of increasing 
prioritization of intellectual and creative works have begun to harness property 
 
most jurisdictions.”); Uniform Conservation Easement Act Summary, supra note 13 (noting that one of 
the “problems with the common law” is that it “has not favored interests ‘in gross’”). 
 32. See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 14; Uniform Conservation Easement Act Summary, 
supra note 13. 
 33. See WHYTE, supra note 23, at 164–66 (describing early legislative efforts); see generally Jean 
Hocker, Foreword to JULIE ANN GUSTANSKI & RODERICK H. SQUIRES, PROTECTING THE LAND: 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, at xvii (2000). 
 34. POWELL, supra note 27, § 34A.02; Hocker, supra note 33, at xvii–iii. 
 35. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT pmbl.,  available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
ulc/fnact99/1980s/ucea81.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2007); see also POWELL, supra note 27, § 34A.02[3] 
(discussing impact of the Act). 
 36. POWELL, supra note 27, § 34A.01. 
 37. Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment 
on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373, 396 (2001). 
 38. Id. at 421; see also, e.g., John L. Hollingshead, Conservation Easements: A Flexible Tool for 
Land Preservation, 3 ENVTL. L. 319, 322 (arguing that conservation easements “present an appealing 
addition” to “traditional land protection measures” in part because “conservation easements are 
voluntary”). 
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rights to serve their goals. The most prominent example of this technique is the 
GNU General Public License, which was developed in the late 1980s by 
Richard Stallman and his non-profit Free Software Foundation.39 The GPL has 
since been adopted by thousands of computer programmers to govern their 
copyrighted software.40 
The GPL is a document that grants permission to copy, distribute, and 
modify the computer software programs to which it applies, provided that 
certain requirements are satisfied. Namely, any copies or modifications that are 
distributed must be accompanied by their source code41 and must be available 
on the GPL’s terms.42 The license announces that any recipient of these copies 
or modifications “automatically receives a license from the original licensor to 
copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to these terms and conditions.”43 
So if all goes as provided in the GPL, everyone who receives a copy (or 
modified version) of the software also receives a license, and their use of the 
software is subject to the license terms. 
Just as a landowner who donates a conservation easement creates an anti-
development encumbrance that binds future generations who possess his land, a 
programmer who attaches the GPL to his software leverages copyright to create 
an encumbrance that binds future generations who build upon the software.44 
Someone who acquires a copy of software covered by the GPL, like a 
landowner who acquires land covered by a conservation easement, has the right 
to do many things with her acquisition (use it, copy and adapt it so long as the 
GPL’s conditions are observed) but not other things (publicly distribute copies 
or adaptations without their source code or licensed under non-GPL terms). In 
both cases the idea is to leverage private property rights to serve the public’s 
interest in resources that might otherwise be undersupplied, be they wildlife 
habitats, pretty views of open spaces, or accessible raw materials for future 
intellectual activity. 
One might object at this point that the two mechanisms are fundamentally 
different: the conservation easement is a property right; the obligations it 
 
 39. See GNU General Public License v. 1, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/copying-1.0.html (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2007) [hereinafter GNU General Public License v. 1]. For history, see STEVEN WEBER, 
THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 46–49 (2004); Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding 
and Enforcing Open Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 447–48 (2005). 
 40. See supra note 9. 
 41. Computer programmers use various programming languages to write source code, which is 
then compiled into machine-readable ones and zeros (“binaries”). As Steven Weber helpfully explains, 
“[t]he source code is basically the recipe for the binaries; and if you have the source code, you can 
understand what the author was trying to accomplish when she wrote the program—which means you 
can modify it. If you have just the binaries, you typically cannot either understand or modify them.” 
WEBER, supra note 39, at 4. 
 42. See GNU General Public License v. 2, supra note 8, paras. 1–3, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/ 
gpl.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
 43. See id. para. 6. 
 44. I have compared and contrasted the GPL and conservation easements elsewhere. See Molly 
Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultivating Open Information Platforms: A Land Trust Model, 1 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 309 (2002). 
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imposes “run with the land” and thereby bind every successive owner of the 
burdened parcel. The GPL, by contrast, can be interpreted as series of bilateral 
contracts.45 In return for permission (a “license”) to copy, adapt, and publicly 
distribute the covered software, the first recipient agrees not to violate the 
terms of the GPL and to pass the terms along to the next recipient of a copy of 
the software or any adaptations.46 The next recipient enters into her own 
agreement with the copyright holder, and so on down the line. On this 
contractual view, if recipient A fails to pass along the terms to recipient B and B 
thereafter violates the GPL, the original licensor’s remedy is against A for 
failure to comply with the full terms of the agreement—not against B, who is 
not in contractual privity with the licensor.47 Note, however, that unencumbered 
ownership of a copy of the software gives B no right to copy, adapt, or 
distribute the software itself—rights that the Copyright Act grants exclusively 
to the copyright holder.48 So if the original licensor in this example wants to 
enforce the terms of the GPL against B because, for example, B has distributed 
copies of the software without its source code, she can simply bring a copyright 
infringement suit based on B’s unauthorized exercise of the exclusive right of 
reproduction and public distribution.49 As a practical matter, then, the 
 
 45. Compare Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451, 456 (2005) (“It is likely that a court, in the U.S. or abroad, would 
recognize the GPL as a contract.”), and Margaret J. Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private 
Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1998) 
(describing GPL as a “‘running’ contract”), with Pamela Jones, The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, 
Which Is Why the Sky Isn’t Falling, GROKLAW, Dec. 14, 2003, http://www.groklaw.net/article.php? 
story=20031214210634851 (quoting Free Software Foundation General Counsel Eben Moglen for the 
proposition that “[b]ecause the GPL does not require any promises in return from licensees, it does not 
need contract enforcement in order to work”), and Eben Moglen, Keynote Address at the University of 
Maine Law School’s Fourth Annual Technology and Law Conference: Freeing the Mind: Free Software 
and the Death of Proprietary Culture (June 29, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/maine-speech.html) (asserting that the GPL “requires no 
acceptance” and “requires no contractual obligation”), and  Eben Moglen, Free Software Matters: 
Enforcing the GPL, I, Aug. 12, 2001, available at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/lu-
12.html (discussing the difference between licenses and contracts). The license versus contract question 
is discussed in detail in LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING, SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 53–66 (2004). 
 46. See GNU General Public License v. 2, supra note 8, para. 5. 
 47. Robert Merges applies a comparable contractual analysis to Creative Commons Licenses.  See 
Merges, supra note 3, at 198 (“From a legal perspective, the Creative Commons is a copyright license. 
Thus the entire scheme operates by virtue of contract. Because the terms of use are linked tightly to the 
content, including at the technical level, the hope is that the contract terms ‘run with the content.’ 
Despite the perhaps optimistic labeling of the shorthand notices as ‘deeds,’ for content to stay in the 
semicommons envisioned by the Creative Commons device, there must be an unbroken chain of privity 
of contract between each successive user of the content.”). 
 48. The Copyright Act makes clear that ownership of a copy of a copyrighted work does not imply 
any right to exercise the exclusive rights of a copyright owner with regard to the intangible work of 
authorship embodied by that copy; buying a book does not give the buyer the right to publish it. 17 
U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
 49. See generally David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 241, 256–59 (describing various legal claims that could arise from violation of the terms of the 
GPL). 
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obligations imposed by the GPL run with the software, just as the terms of a 
conservation easement run with the land. 
One might also observe that conservation easements are different from the 
GPL and similar licensing techniques because conservation easements are 
fundamentally restrictive (vis à vis landowners who acquire burdened land), 
whereas the GPL is fundamentally, if conditionally, permissive (vis à vis people 
who acquire software licensed under the GPL). There is something to this 
distinction, which is addressed more fully below, but it should not be overstated. 
Consider a potential landowner who is contemplating the purchase of land 
burdened by a conservation easement that forbids non-agricultural use of the 
land. At this point the would-be owner has no rights to the land. He does not 
have the right to use it for agricultural purposes or for industrial purposes; he 
does not have the right to set foot on it without the current owner’s permission. 
These activities would all amount to trespass under property law. When he 
purchases the land he gains many rights that he did not have before and that he 
could have been denied altogether. Even though there are things he cannot do 
because they are forbidden by the terms of the easement, the transaction as a 
whole can be viewed as fundamentally permissive. Someone with no rights to 
use land has gained some rights, albeit not every right that might come in a 
typical landownership bundle. Similarly, someone who acquires a piece of 
software governed by the GPL goes from having no rights to copy, adapt, and 
publicly distribute that software (all activities that would amount to 
infringement under the background law of copyright) to having limited rights to 
do those things. 
The correspondence between the two mechanisms is not exact, but for now 
suffice it to say that there are clear parallels between conservation easements 
and the GPL, the methodology of which has now been adopted for other types 
of creative works. Creative Commons is a non-profit organization (founded by 
Boyle, among others50) that promotes licenses designed to be applied to a 
variety of copyrightable works, including text, images, movies, et cetera.51 Like 
the GPL, these licenses permit copying, distribution and, in some cases, 
modification of covered works, but subject to certain conditions that copyright 
holders choose from a menu of terms.52 Among these is a “share alike” 
provision, which, like the GPL, requires that derivative works be licensed on 
the same terms.53 That is, the creator of a derivative work based upon a work 
licensed under a Creative Commons share-alike license must give other people 
permission to copy and modify that derivative work (subject to the condition 
that they do the same with their derivative works, and so on). Again, the license 
 
 50. I am a past staff member and current member of the Board of Directors. 
 51. Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
 52. See Creative Commons, Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/about/ 
licenses/meet-the-licenses (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
 53. Id. 
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leverages copyright to create an anti-exclusion encumbrance that binds future 
generations who build upon the copyrighted work. 
Like conservation easements, these tools for cultural environmentalism 
have been widely adopted and praised—both for their potential to improve the 
environment for software innovation and cultural creativity, and for their 
reliance on voluntary, property-based mechanisms.54 
IV 
QUESTIONING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
Despite the initial success of the property turn in cultural environmentalism, 
advocates should consider objections that have dogged their predecessors in the 
conservation easement movement. These objections have increasingly been 
raised in the cultural context as well. 
There have long been critics of conservation easements.55 These critics 
represent part of a broader dialogue about the value of restrictive common-law 
rules governing servitudes,56 and a still broader dialogue about the value of 
standardization and consolidation of property rights.57 
To simplify a rich and nuanced literature: critics of conservation easements, 
defenders of restrictions on the subject matter and enforceability of servitudes, 
and advocates of standardization and consolidation of property rights all argue 
to various degrees that the law should not recognize an infinite variety of 
property bundles. Allowing individual property rights to be idiosyncratically 
divided up and rearranged is associated with several problems in this 
literature.58 For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to focus on two 
concerns: inadequate or costly notice of the nature of idiosyncratic property 
rights to buyers and affected third parties, and limitations on the flexibility that 
future generations retain to put resources to their best uses after the various 
rights related to those resources have been redistributed in novel ways. 
 
 54. See generally Merges, supra note 3, at 183–84; WEBER, supra note 39, at 114–15 (2004); Carver, 
supra note 39, at 447–48 (describing and explaining the success of GPL); Ariana Eunjung Cha, Creative 
Commons is Rewriting Rules of Copyright, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2005, at E01. 
 55. See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, supra note 15, at 457. For a more recent critique, see Julia D. 
Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002). 
 56. See, e.g., Susan F. French, The Touch and Concern Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of 
Servitudes: A Tribute to Lawrence E. Berger, 77 NEB. L. REV. 653, 659 (1998) [hereinafter French, The 
Touch and Concern Doctrine]; James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: 
Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4–
5 (1989); Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
883, 894 (1988); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude 
Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 617 (1985); Richard Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the 
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1983); Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of 
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (1982) [hereinafter French, 
Ancient Strands]; Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 
1183 (1982). 
 57. E.g., Merrill & Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, supra note 17; Heller, supra note 17. 
 58. I explore these problems more fully in other work.  See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The 
New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008). 
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A. Notice and Information Costs 
Courts and commentators seem to agree that servitudes—including 
conservation easements—should not generally bind purchasers who acquire 
land with no notice of the encumbrance and no reasonable opportunity to 
acquire notice.59 The importance of notice is often identified as a rationale for 
the common law’s limitations on servitudes.60 For example, by requiring (for 
some purposes) that servitudes have some connection to land that they burden, 
and to a (typically neighboring) benefited parcel, the touch and concern 
doctrine helps to ensure that servitudes will be relatively easy to discover upon 
physical inspection, and that the owner of the beneficial interest will be 
relatively easy to identify and locate.61 By limiting the subject matter of 
servitudes, the doctrine also shapes and reinforces expectations in a way that 
limits surprise.62 
The touch and concern requirement and other traditional common-law 
limitations on servitudes inform a recent debate about the role that 
standardization of property rights plays in reducing notice and other 
information costs. In an influential 2000 article, Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith observe that “the law will enforce as property only those interests that 
conform to a limited number of standard forms.”63 In civil-law countries, this 
standardization of property forms is explicitly recognized and referred to as the 
numerus clausus principle.64 Merrill and Smith argue that it operates consistently 
in common-law systems as well, reflected in cases like Keppell v. Bailey, which 
famously insisted that “[i]t must not . . . be supposed that incidents of a novel 
kind can be devised and attached to property at the fancy and caprice of any 
owner.”65 
Only certain types of property interests are recognized by law, according to 
Merrill and Smith, because infinite variety would raise the information costs 
associated with every property transaction (or potentially infringing activity).66 
 
 59. But see POWELL, supra note 27, § 34.21[2] (citing cases enforcing easements by prescription 
even against bona fide purchasers without notice). 
 60. See, e.g., French, Ancient Strands, supra note 56, at 1283–86. 
 61. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 402 (2002) 
(“Servitudes that meet this [touch and concern] requirement are much easier to verify by physical 
inspection of the property and its surroundings . . . .”). 
 62. See generally French, Ancient Strands, supra note 56, at 1290  (“The touch and concern 
requirement tends to assure that parties will be bound only to the obligations which a reasonable 
purchaser would expect to have incurred, and will acquire only the benefits which a reasonable 
purchaser would expect to have gotten.”). 
 63. Merrill & Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, supra note 17, at 3. 
 64. Id. at 4. 
 65. 39 ENG. REP. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834); see generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND 
LAW 256–60 (1986) (discussing cases). But see Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 ENG. REP. 1143 (Ch. 1848) (taking a 
broader view than Keppell of restrictive covenants enforceable in equity). 
 66. Unlike some defenders of the common-law restrictions on servitudes, Merrill and Smith worry 
less about notice to buyers of idiosyncratically configured property than about bystanders. Merrill & 
Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, supra note 17, at 31–35. 
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They explain, “The existence of unusual property rights increases the cost of 
processing information about all property rights. Those creating or transferring 
idiosyncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases 
in measurement costs fully into account, making them a true externality.”67 
Merrill and Smith go on to observe that the various rules limiting servitudes—
and other doctrines that limit idiosyncratic property rights—keep these 
information costs in check. They point to the touch and concern requirement as 
an example of a doctrinal technique that standardizes servitudes and thus limits 
the information costs they impose.68 
It is hardly surprising, then, that some critics worry that notice and 
information-cost problems will plague conservation easements now that the 
common-law limitations have been removed.69 One critic complains, for 
example, that “[c]alling something a conservation easement tells one nothing 
about what protections it affords or even what legal boilerplate it includes.”70 
On the other hand, concerns with notice and information costs have been 
addressed to some extent by the advent of land-recording and marketable-title 
acts, which facilitate public recording of servitudes and other records of land 
ownership and which protect bona fide purchasers from unrecorded 
encumbrances and title problems.71 The promulgators of the UCEA dismissed 
common-law obstacles to conservation easements as “artificial and archaic” in 
light of these mechanisms for providing would-be acquirers of land with the 
terms of any relevant servitudes and the identities of their holders.72 Indeed, the 
recent Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes eliminates the touch and 
concern requirement altogether, for both conservation easements and other 
types of servitudes. Even some critics of conservation easements concede that 
land-recording systems address the problem of notice and information costs 
that triggered some of the common-law limitations.73 
 
 67. Id. at 8. 
 68. Id. at 17. 
 69. See, e.g., Jeff Pidot, Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Reinventing Conservation Easements, LAND 
LINES NEWSLETTER, Apr. 2005, available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/pub-detail.asp?id=1010. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 40 (“As the costs of standardization to the parties and the 
government shift, we expect the optimal degree of standardization to rise or fall. Consider the rise of 
registers of interests in real property, that is, recording acts. This device lowers the costs of notice; it is 
an alternative method of lowering information costs.”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 61, at 407 
(noting that recordation of servitudes “avoid[s] many of the additional . . . costs that effective 
verification of these rights would otherwise require”); Epstein, supra note 56, at 1358 (“[W]ith notice 
secured by recordation, freedom of contract should control.”). On recording acts generally, see 
POWELL, supra note 27, § 82.01. On marketable title acts, see id.  § 82.04. 
 72. Uniform Conservation Easement Act Summary, supra note 13. 
 73. Soon after promulgation of the UCEA, in the midst of the movement to authorize conservation 
easements under state law, Gerald Korngold published a powerful critique. But he agreed with the 
proponents of conservation servitudes that land recording acts address the problem of notice, which 
had justified some of the traditional limitations on servitudes. As he acknowledged, “[b]ecause the 
holder of a servitude must record it or risk losing it to a bona fide purchaser, a potential purchaser 
easily can identify outstanding claims . . . .” Korngold, supra note 15, at 456. 
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In sum, concern with providing adequate notice about the nature of 
property rights and minimizing information costs for both acquirers of property 
and third parties is an important theme in the literature explaining the 
common-law restrictions on servitudes and other limitations on idiosyncratic 
property rights. Some critics of conservation easements worry that unrestrained 
and idiosyncratic conservation easements will impose costly confusion on future 
landowners and others.74 But most commentators—even those critical of 
conservation easements and other violations of the common-law rules 
governing servitudes—recognize that the notice problem is ameliorated 
somewhat by the U.S. land-recording system.75 It is important, nonetheless, to 
flag the issue of notice and its historical role in the debate about conservation 
easements and other servitudes because the notice and information-cost savings 
provided by land recording are not necessarily replicated for other types of 
resources. Copyright, as explained below, lacks a similar mechanism for 
addressing these problems. 
B. The Problem of the Future 
Assuring adequate notice and minimizing information costs are not the only 
justifications for standardizing property rights and restricting servitudes. There 
is another constellation of concerns usefully categorized using Julia Mahoney’s 
term “the problem of the future.”76 Included within this constellation are a 
number of related issues regarding the extent to which enforcement of 
unorthodox types of servitudes and other idiosyncratic property rights 
undesirably limits the freedom of future generations to manage resources wisely 
and autonomously.77 The theme is excessive control by one generation over the 
freedom and flexibility of the next. The specific concerns are that excessive 
control will limit autonomy and recreate feudal incidents, impose inefficient 
land-use choices, and threaten freedom of alienation. These problems arise not 
only from manipulation of property rights by an earlier generation but also 
from the transaction costs that make that manipulation difficult to undo. 
Mahoney raises the problem of the future specifically in the context of 
perpetual conservation easements.78 She observes, 
 
 74. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 75. E.g., Gerald Korngold, Reply: Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners 
Associations: For Reformation Not Termination, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 513, 518 (1984) (“[T]he recording 
acts can be enforced strictly, and rules of inquiry notice can be interpreted closely to prevent a 
purchaser without notice from being bound by a servitude.”). 
 76. Mahoney, supra note 55; see also French, supra note 12, at 2523. See generally Merrill & Smith, 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, supra note 17, at 7 (surveying the literature and observing that “[t]he 
primary candidate for an economic explanation [for the numerus clausus] has been the suggestion that 
the numerus clausus is a device for minimizing the effects of durable property interests on those dealing 
with assets in the future . . . .”). 
 77. See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 112–19 (1993). 
 78. Note that Mahoney’s concerns are tentative. As she concedes, “Because conservation 
easements have been imposed on land in large numbers only since the 1980s, it is impossible to know 
03__VAN HOUWELING.DOC 8/8/2007  9:16 AM 
Spring 2007] THE CONSTRUCTED COMMONS 37 
Conservation easements . . . impose significant potential costs on future generations by 
deliberately making non-development decisions hard to change. This means that 
future generations either will be stuck with their forbearers’ land preservation choices, 
which will almost certainly fail to reflect contemporary cultural values and advances in 
ecological science, or will have to expend resources to extinguish (or at the very least 
renegotiate or have declared invalid) the conservation servitudes that constrict their 
options.79 
Mahoney’s concern with the problem of the future echoes earlier critiques of 
conservation easements, which complained about the dead-hand control they 
exert over future generations.80 These concerns about the problem of the future 
and the danger of dead-hand control in turn resonate with the larger 
jurisprudence and literature on servitudes. Various courts and commentators 
have defended common-law restrictions on servitudes on the grounds that 
servitudes can give previous generations too much control over the resource-
use decisions of future generations. 
A classic statement on dead-hand control comes from Lewis Simes, who 
argued in his lectures on “Public Policy and the Dead Hand,” that “[i]t is 
socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living 
members and not by the dead.”81 Simes went on to quote Thomas Jefferson, 
who insisted in a letter to James Madison that “[t]he earth belongs always to the 
living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they 
please during their usufruct.”82 
This preference for the living over the dead is often justified in terms of 
autonomy and contrasted with feudal serfdom.83 In this view, controlling people 
who are distant in time and space—not family members or contractual privies—
is a power associated with government (or with undesirable feudal hierarchy). 
Such control should not be unilaterally imposed by private parties merely on 
 
for certain how difficult it will be to modify or terminate these instruments.” Mahoney, supra note 55, 
at 779. 
 79. Id. at 744 (footnotes omitted). 
 80. E.g., Korngold, supra note 15, at 440, 457. 
 81. LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59 (1955). 
 82. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON at 121 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895)). 
 83. As Uriel Reichman puts it in his discussion of servitudes, “Private property is sanctioned by 
society not only to promote efficiency, but also to safeguard individual freedom. Servitudes are a kind 
of private legislation affecting a line of future owners. Limiting such ‘legislative powers’ . . . eliminates 
the possibility of creating modern variations of feudal serfdom.” Reichman, supra note 56, at 1233. For 
a skeptical view, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth 
Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1258 (1985) (“The appeal of this view [limiting dead-hand control] lies 
not in its logic but in the emotive content of the dead hand as a symbol. The appeal to a struggle against 
the dead hand has historically been an effective rhetorical strategy . . . because reference to the dead 
hand evokes images of aristocracy and wealth inequality based on feudal-like hierarchy.”). Alexander 
points out elsewhere the indeterminacy of autonomy and freedom of choice criteria for enforcing or 
limiting servitudes: “Reichman’s interpretation seeks to maximize the liberty interest of all owners, 
present and future. Epstein’s interpretation maximizes the freedom of the only owner at the time the 
servitude is created. The choice between these two contradictory interpretations cannot be based on an 
abstract commitment to freedom of choice itself; both choices are simultaneously freedom-enhancing 
and coercive.” Alexander, supra note 56, at 891. 
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the basis of their property ownership and informed only by their “whim and 
caprice.”84 
The concern with dead-hand control is also often discussed in utilitarian 
terms: the land-use choices of previous generations may turn out to be 
inefficient ones in light of changed circumstances. Mahoney’s reference to 
“advances in ecological science,” for example, reflects a concern that 
conservation servitudes that bind future landowners may compel ultimately 
undesirable land uses (or, more likely, forbid desirable ones).85 
Where voluntary termination of conservation easements is allowed by law 
(as it typically but not always is86) the mechanism by which dead-hand control 
limits autonomy or efficiency requires further explanation. The potential 
problem is that transaction costs may block a negotiated solution—even when 
all affected parties would, in theory, agree to extinguish the unwanted 
servitude. The current holders of the servitude’s beneficial interest may be 
difficult to identify and locate, and they may be so numerous as to make contact 
and negotiation infeasible. Defenders of limitations on servitudes often point to 
this specter of transaction-cost-insulated servitudes as a justification for policies 
that either constrain the subject matter of servitudes or enable judges to 
terminate the detrimental ones.87 In fact, the UCEA and most state statutes 
acknowledge the possibility of judicial modification or termination of 
conservation easements on the basis of changed circumstances.88 But seeking 
judicial intervention might itself be difficult or uncertain enough to inefficiently 
constrain some desirable land uses.89 
 
 84. Copelan v. Acree Oil Co., 290 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1982) (“It is the general rule that the owner of 
land has the right to use it for any lawful purpose, and restrictions upon its use must be clearly 
established and strictly construed. Doubt as to restrictions and use will be construed in favor of the 
grantee. Underlying this rule is the sound policy that land use must be governed by its present owners, 
and should be subjected only in severely restricted circumstances to control by former owners. Were 
this not the law, any whim and caprice, once set down by deed, could diminish or destroy the utility of 
real property for fully two decades [the term at issue in the case].”) (internal citations omitted). 
 85. Mahoney, supra note 55, at 744; see also Korngold, supra note 15, at 457 (arguing that “[t]he 
market response of a future property owner to the future needs of society is likely to be more effective 
than a past owner’s fixed blueprint”). 
 86. In some states, statutes make it difficult to terminate a conservation easement even if the 
easement holder agrees. But usually conservation easements, like other types of servitudes, can be 
voluntarily extinguished by negotiation with the holder of the non-possessory interest. See generally 
BYERS & PONTE, supra note 5, at 195–96. 
 87. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 56, at 1233 (“[O]bligations not related to actual property use 
are highly individualized. They tend, therefore, to become inefficient in the short run following a 
transfer. Consensual termination of such rights might not occur because of prohibitive transaction costs. 
The best way to insure efficient termination of such arrangements is to shift the burden of negotiation; 
instead of making the transferee negotiate for a release, the aspiring beneficiary will have to reach 
agreement with each new owner.”); French, The Touch and Concern Doctrine, supra note 56, at 1314–
15 (explaining that “the difficulty of locating all the parties with interests in servitudes and the need for 
unanimous consent” presents “obstacles to privately negotiated releases and modifications of 
servitudes . . . .”). 
 88. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 3, cmt. (1982). 
 89. See Mahoney, supra note 55, at 777–79. 
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Inefficient but transaction-cost-insulated servitudes represent a species of 
the anti-commons problem described by Michael Heller with regard to 
fragmentation of property interests more generally. Conservation easements 
and other servitudes divide rights in a single parcel of land among multiple 
owners. If it is later desirable to consolidate those rights in order to put the 
resource to its best use, fragmentation of the property bundle (and the 
transaction costs involved in re-bundling) can make consolidation difficult. 
Heller cites restrictions on servitudes among “numerous restraints [that] limit 
an individual’s capacity to break up property bundles too much.”90 
Heller’s concern with fragmentation offers an interesting way to think about 
the classic but under-theorized concern with restraints on alienation, which is 
also often cited as a rationale for limiting servitudes. Many legal mechanisms 
that are criticized for restraining alienation—including conservation easements 
and other novel servitudes—do not in fact directly restrain transfer. They 
merely limit the rights that can be acquired from any single owner. So a 
subsequent user who wants to reassemble property rights into a useful bundle 
must tackle the transaction costs involved in multiple negotiations. Often the 
problem is not so much restraint on alienation as restraint on acquisition: every 
individual stick in the property can be sold; the difficulty is in buying a bundle 
that is useful to own. 
The various concerns associated with “the problem of the future” have long 
motivated common-law restrictions on servitudes. And contemporary property 
theorists point to them to justify a variety of doctrines that serve to standardize 
and consolidate property rights. To date, these concerns have not undermined 
enforcement of (statutorily authorized) conservation easements generally, but 
they have been used to justify judicial modification or termination in some 
cases. And some critics contend that they justify a more thorough reassessment 
of the conservation easement mechanism. Critics of the recent property turn in 
cultural environmentalism suggest that these same concerns counsel caution in 
that context as well. 
 
 90. Heller, supra note 17, at 666 (“An owner can decompose her bundle by granting multiple rights 
of exclusion in an object: for example, by creating restrictive covenants enforceable by each owner in a 
residential land subdivision. Again, however, American law provides mechanisms that over time 
usually operate to restore a core private property bundle to a single owner. Indeed, there are relatively 
few cases in the American law of property in which multiple owners of privileges of inclusion or rights 
of exclusion in an object cannot escape from each other over time.”); see also Mahoney, supra note 55, 
at 785 (“Conservation servitudes make use of property rights to achieve preservation goals, but in 
doing so, they engineer the fragmentation of the rights associated with a particular tract of land, 
thereby reducing flexibility for later landowners. In essence, conservation easements ensure that a 
given tract of land will not have a single owner, thereby foregoing the powerful advantages of single 
ownership.”). See generally Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights: 
A Functional Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1 (2003), 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/iss1/art2; Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 595 (2002). 
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V 
CULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENTS REVISITED 
Where do the GPL and Creative Commons licenses fit in this ongoing 
debate about conservation easements, idiosyncratic servitudes, and the 
malleability and fragmentation of property rights? These tools of cultural 
environmentalism bear at least facial similarity to conservation easements.91 
Several observers have noted this similarity,92 some suggesting that common-law 
limitations on servitudes could or should stand in the way of the enforcement of 
these licenses—much as the common-law rules once threatened conservation 
easements.93 And critics have raised concerns about information costs and dead-
hand control that echo criticism of conservation easements and other novel 
servitudes.94 For example, Niva Elkin-Koren has criticized Creative Commons 
licenses for lacking the standardization associated with the numerus clausus 
principle.95 Zachary Katz has suggested that certain Creative Commons licenses 
“may . . . cause dead-hand control problems.”96 And Richard Epstein has 
complained colorfully about the “creeping imperialism of the GPL.”97 Indeed, 
problems with information costs and dead-hand control do pose challenges to 
these tools of cultural environmentalism. But on close examination the root 
cause of these problems seems to be copyright law itself. 
A. Notice and Information Costs 
One rationale commonly offered for various restrictions on the creation and 
enforceability of servitudes is that subsequent purchasers (and affected third 
parties) may have inadequate notice of the burdens or limitations that come 
with ownership of the encumbered asset. And one criticism of conservation 
easements in particular is that they come in so many varieties and impose so 
many different restrictions that even with formal notice landowners and 
easement holders may not understand their rights and responsibilities. 
 
 91. See discussion supra Part III. 
 92. See supra notes 39–54 and accompanying text. The comparison is usually drawn to servitudes 
generally, not to conservation easements in particular.  See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the 
Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 306 (2003); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and 
Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1138–39 (2000); Mark Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law 
and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 121, 148 (1999); William W. Fisher 
III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1998). See generally 
Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of 
Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (1994). 
 93. Margaret Jane Radin, for example, describes the GPL as an “attempt to make commitments 
run with a digital object”—suggesting perhaps that the GPL should be unenforceable as an invalid 
attempt to impose a servitude on personal property. Radin, supra note 92, at 1132, 1139–40. 
 94. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16; Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative 
Commons, 46 IDEA 391, 393–94 (2006). 
 95. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 408–15. 
 96. Katz, supra note 94, at 409. 
 97. Richard Epstein, Why Open Source is Unsustainable, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, available at 
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/78d9812a-2386-11d9-aee5-00000e2511c8.html. Ironically, Epstein is elsewhere 
a defender of the dead hand. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 56. 
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As discussed above, concerns with notice are somewhat less pressing in light 
of the modern system of land recording in the United States (although 
confusion over the meaning of terms within a known servitude might remain).98 
When servitude-like restrictions are imposed on resources other than land, 
however, notice problems can loom larger. In fact, the traditional rule is that 
servitudes are not permitted on personal property,99 a distinction that some 
observers attribute to the absence of a comprehensive recording system for 
chattels.100 
Even when notice is provided, it may not be effective. The Supreme Court 
was clearly skeptical about the effectiveness of the notice provided for the 
chattel servitude attempted in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,101 in which 
the Court refused to enforce a use restriction printed on a plate attached to 
record players: “[I]t must be recognized that not one purchaser in many would 
read such a notice, and that not one in a much greater number, if he did read it, 
could understand its involved and intricate phraseology, which bears many 
evidences of being framed to conceal rather than to make clear its real meaning 
and purpose.”102 
Some observers argue that in the context of servitude-like restrictions on 
digital copies of creative works—the typical subject matter of both the GPL and 
Creative Commons licenses103—the notice problems that might otherwise plague 
chattel servitudes are not so serious, because it is relatively easy to attach 
detailed notice to digital objects via link, pop-up window, et cetera.104 The 
concern from Victor Talking Machines about inattentive or uncomprehending 
purchasers still seems relevant here, however. 
Although the GPL and Creative Commons licenses (or a URL pointing to 
their text) are typically embedded within the source code of software or posted 
 
 98. And recording systems are themselves confusing and difficult to navigate. See generally 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 61, at 402. 
 99. Merrill & Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, supra note 17, at 18. 
 100. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 61, at 407 (citing the absence of registries as one reason 
the law “makes it much simpler to establish partial rights in real property than in personal property”). 
But see Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004) (criticizing the 
distinction). 
 101. 243 U.S. 490 (1917). 
 102. Id. at 501. 
 103. Creative Commons licenses have also been attached to books and other analog manifestations 
of copyrighted works. For examples, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW 
SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006), available under a Creative 
Commons license at http://www.benkler.org/wealth_of_networks/index.php/Main_Page; CORY 
DOCTOROW, DOWN AND OUT IN THE MAGIC KINGDOM (2003), available under a Creative Commons 
license at http://craphound.com/down/download.php; LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 
(2004), available under a Creative Commons license at http://www.free-culture.cc/freecontent/. 
 104. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
“Newtonian” World of On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 122 (1997) (“While the 
efficacy of third-party notice in markets for real property interests is debatable, cyberspace seems 
entirely different. Unlike an easement (or servitude), evidence of which does not normally appear on 
the face of the land, digital content is quite capable of providing notice concerning the ownership rights 
retained by its creator or other parties.”). 
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prominently on the website where licensed digital content is available, these 
methods may not guarantee effective notice in every case.105 One complication is 
that there are many varieties of Creative Commons licenses106 and many 
permissive software licenses in addition to the GPL.107 Just as the wide variety of 
conservation easements has caused some confusion among landowners and 
easement holders,108 the variety of licenses promulgated by cultural 
environmentalists has surely caused some confusion among copyright holders 
and licensees.109 Cultural environmentalists themselves seem to have recognized 
this problem, acknowledging that “license proliferation” increases information-
processing costs for people trying to figure out what they may do with creative 
works.110 
Any potential shortcomings in the notice provided by the GPL and Creative 
Commons licenses should be understood against the background law of 
copyright, however. Part of the notice problem associated with servitudes (at 
least in the absence of a recording system) is that they are bundled with 
possession of land in a way that upsets ingrained expectations about a lawful 
possessor’s rights to use her possessions. But the same background assumption 
of freedom is not possible in the context of copyright, which creates 
nonpossessory rights that do not require notice—rights whose owners can be 
near or distant, single or multiple, known or unknown. 
After a series of amendments to the Copyright Act starting in 1976, federal 
copyright protection is now triggered simply by fixation of an original work in 
“any tangible medium of expression”111—by scribbling words on a napkin or 
typing them onto a computer, for example. In a departure from prior law, 
notice, deposit, and publication are not required to secure protection and no 
renewal registration is required to take advantage of the longest possible 
copyright term.112 Those barriers have been removed and copyright protection is 
 
 105. I explore the issue of ineffective notice provided by licenses attached to intangible works more 
fully in other work.  See Van Houweling, supra note 58. 
 106. See supra note 52. 
 107. See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, Various Licenses and Comments About Them, 
http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/index_html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
 108. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Katz, supra note 94, at 393 (“[T]he increasing variety of CC licenses may give rise to user 
confusion as licensors struggle to determine which license is best suited to their needs and licensees fail 
to understand the precise rights and obligations that attach to a licensed work. The transaction costs 
resulting from these uncertainties affect the open source software community and are potentially 
substantial obstacles to broader and more rapid adoption of CC licenses.”); see generally Elkin-Koren, 
supra note 16, at 407–15; Matthew D. Stein, Comment, Rethinking UCITA: Lessons from the Open 
Source Movement, 58 ME. L. REV. 157 (2006). 
 110. See Stephen Shankland, Open-Source Overseer Proposes Paring License List, ZDNET NEWS, 
Mar. 3, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5596344.html; Open Source Initiative, Charter for 
License Proliferation (LP) Committee of the Open Source Initiative (OSI), http://www.opensource.org/ 
docs/policy/lpcharter.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 112. Id. § 408. 
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now automatic.113 This means that when someone comes upon what appears to 
be an original work of expression fixed in a tangible medium—an old 
photograph, for example—she does not know how the work is encumbered by 
copyright.114 It could be in the public domain because it was published without 
notice during a time when copyright could be lost that way; it could be in the 
public domain because its copyright has expired; or it could be under copyright, 
held by an unknown copyright holder. Without more information, the only safe 
assumption is that all of those activities that implicate the exclusive rights 
granted by copyright (reproduction, public distribution, preparation of 
derivative works, et cetera) are forbidden. 
Against this background of potentially hidden restrictions, the GPL and 
Creative Commons licenses do not appear to impose additional and surprising 
constraints. Although some of the conditions imposed by these licenses differ in 
substance from copyright law, they are all triggered by activities that are within 
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights.115 For example, all Creative Commons 
licenses require that publicly distributed copies and derivative works properly 
attribute the original author.116 Attribution is not, per se, an exclusive right of a 
copyright holder.117 But reproducing the copyrighted work and making 
derivative works based upon it are exclusive rights. A license that waives those 
exclusive rights on the condition that copying and adaptation are accompanied 
by attribution does not impose a surprising new limitation when measured 
against the background assumption that copying and adaptation are forbidden 
altogether. 
Of course, in the land context one could say that a servitude that limits the 
uses of land merely imposes on a landowner a less-restrictive subset of the 
limitations that would be already be imposed upon her by the law of trespass if 
she had not acquired any rights to the land in the first place. Courts and 
commentators nonetheless worry about enforcing servitudes with insufficient 
notice. But the law of real property has conditioned land buyers to expect that 
once they acquire a piece of land, the restrictive background law of trespass is 
 
 113. See generally Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 494 
(2004). 
 114. See generally UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON 
ORPHAN WORKS 15 (January 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-
full.pdf; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
471, 477 (2003) (attributing “tracing costs” involved in determining the ownership of copyrighted works 
to “the absence of registration”). 
 115. But see discussion infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text (noting the caveats to this 
assertion with regard to the GPL). 
 116. E.g., Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License § 4(c), 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/legalcode (last visited May 1, 2007). The author or 
licensor can also “designate another party or parties (e.g. a sponsor institute, publishing entity, 
journal)” to receive attribution. Id. 
 117. But see 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (establishing limited attribution rights for “the author of a 
work of visual art”). 
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no longer relevant to their use of that land.118 Copyright law, by contrast, does 
not give the same solicitude to people who acquire books, computer programs, 
and other creative works; with a few exceptions and limitations,119 it imposes 
proprietary limitations upon their use of those works without regard to notice. 
In light of that background, licenses that conditionally remove limitations and 
attempt to give notice (albeit possibly imperfect) to licensees seem to alleviate 
rather than impose notice problems. 
The notice problem would be more serious if these licenses imposed 
conditions on behavior that was outside the scope of copyright’s exclusive 
rights—if, for example, Creative Commons licenses required attribution even 
on adaptations of the covered work that were too dissimilar to the original to 
count as “derivative works” under copyright law, or on reproductions of the 
covered work that amounted to non-infringing “fair use.”120 It seems unlikely 
that Creative Commons licenses would ever be interpreted so broadly, since 
they borrow language directly from the Copyright Act (to define “derivative 
work,” for example) and expressly provide that “[n]othing in this license is 
intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any uses free from copyright or rights 
arising from limitations or exceptions that are provided for in connection with 
the copyright protection under copyright law or other applicable laws.”121 
There is some controversy on this point in the context of the GPL.122 The 
GPL imposes conditions on copying and distribution of a covered computer 
program and “work based on the Program,” which is in turn defined as “either 
the Program or any derivative work under copyright law—that is to say, a work 
containing the Program or a portion of it, either verbatim or with modifications 
and/or translated into another language.”123 Although this language refers 
directly to copyright law, its definition of “work based on the Program” is 
arguably broader than the legal definition of “derivative work,” at least under 
U.S. law. Not every program that contains “a portion of” a GPL-licensed 
program will be similar enough to the original to constitute a derivative work. If 
the GPL were interpreted nonetheless to impose conditions on preparing, 
 
 118. Like most arguments based on expectations, this one is somewhat circular. If servitudes of all 
sorts were enforceable without notice to the purchaser of the burdened land, the land purchasers’ 
expectations would be much different. But circularity notwithstanding, arguments from expectations 
play a central role in the law of property. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1027–28 (1992) (“[O]ur ‘takings’ jurisprudence . . . has traditionally been guided by the 
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State’s power over, the ‘bundle of 
rights’ that they acquire when they obtain title to property.”). 
 119. For example, the “first sale doctrine,” codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), provides that 
notwithstanding a copyright holder’s exclusive right of public distribution, an owner of a lawfully made 
copy of a copyrighted work may “sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy.” 
 120. Niva Elkin-Koren raises this possibility without endorsing it. Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 
404. 
 121. E.g., Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License, supra note 116, § 
2. 
 122. See generally ROSEN, supra note 45, at 114–21 (discussing ambiguity and dispute about the 
coverage of the GPL). 
 123. GNU General Public License v. 2, supra note 8, para. 0. 
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copying, and distributing such a program, those conditions would be more 
restrictive than the background law of copyright—and thus potentially 
surprising to someone who did not receive adequate notice.124 
A lesson for cultural environmentalists that emerges from the conservation 
easement experience—and from the history and jurisprudence of servitudes 
more generally—is that property-based restrictions on the use of a resource can 
cause unfair surprise and confusion where those restrictions are inconsistent 
with baseline assumptions about what it means to acquire that resource. Where 
the baseline is defined by the law of copyright, many restrictions will not in fact 
be unfairly surprising or confusing—so long as they limit or impose conditions 
upon only activities that would otherwise be prohibited. But when a license 
attempts to limit or condition behavior that is not within the exclusive rights of 
the copyright holder, the problem of notice becomes more serious. This does 
not appear to be an issue for the current Creative Commons licenses, or for the 
GPL as narrowly interpreted; but broader readings that extend restrictions 
beyond the copyright baseline would raise more serious notice problems. 
 
 124. This potential problem would have been exacerbated by terms in the first, and now superseded, 
draft for the GPLv3, released in early 2006 by the Free Software Foundation. GNU, Draft General 
Public License, v. 3, available at http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl-draft-2006-01-16.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) 
(first discussion draft). Among other new and modified provisions, the draft included the following: 
“This License gives unlimited permission to privately modify and run the Program, provided you do not 
bring suit for patent infringement against anyone for making, using or distributing their own works 
based on the Program.” Id. § 2. This language was a significant departure from prior versions of the 
GPL in that it quite expressly purported to place a condition on activity not otherwise within the 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder, at least under U.S. law. Of course, the Copyright Act does not 
give copyright holders exclusive rights to bring suit for patent infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing 
exclusive rights in copyrighted works). Neither does the Copyright Act give copyright holders an 
exclusive right to “run” software. Id. And to the extent that exercise of some genuine exclusive right, 
e.g. reproduction, is a necessary step in running the software, that step does not trigger liability because 
of 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), which allows the owner of a copy of a computer program to copy that program as 
necessary to use the program on his computer. Because neither running nor patenting software is 
within the exclusive rights of the copyright holder, the GPLv3’s purported limitation on a patent 
litigant’s right to “run” the software could have been surprising and confusing to a user who had 
received inadequate notice of the GPL’s terms. 
The FSF released a new version of the draft, in which this troubling language has been modified. 
GNU, Draft General Public License, v. 3, available at http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl-draft-2006-07-27.html (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2007) (second discussion draft). The language quoted above has been replaced by the 
following: “This License permits you to make and run privately modified versions of the Program, or 
have others make and run them on your behalf. However, this permission terminates, as to all such 
versions, if you bring suit against anyone for patent infringement of any of your essential patent claims 
in any such version, for making, using, selling or otherwise conveying a work based on the Program in 
compliance with this License.” Id. § 2. Although the difference is extremely subtle, this language is 
better because it only purports to condition rights to make and run modified versions of the program. If 
modified versions amount to derivative works under copyright law, the preparation of which is an 
exclusive right of the copyright holder, then this provision arguably only limits behavior that was within 
the exclusive rights of the copyright holder in the first place. (Although “running” still is not an 
exclusive right of the copyright holder, running a modified version may involve copying and adaptation 
beyond the bounds of 17 U.S.C. § 117.) 
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B. The Problem of the Future 
Imagine that a piece of GPL-licensed software is, decades from now, 
preserved only in an obsolete and somehow fragile format. The one entity 
interested in going to the trouble and expense of preserving it by transferring it 
to a modern format is a commercial software company that insists on 
subsequently distributing copies of the software without its source code and 
without a copy of the GPL attached. That behavior would be outside the terms 
of the GPL and would violate the exclusive reproduction rights of the copyright 
holders unless they gave their permission; yet it might be socially valuable if 
otherwise the creativity and innovation embodied in the software would be lost. 
This looks like the problem of the future translated into the context of 
cultural conservation easements. One generation of creators has made choices 
about resource use that constrain the choices of a subsequent generation, under 
circumstances in which society might benefit from revisiting those choices. In 
theory, those choices could be reconsidered—the copyright holders could give 
permission. In reality, it may be impossible, or at least prohibitively costly, to 
successfully identify, locate, and bargain with all of the individuals who have 
contributed to a single software project. Transaction costs, exacerbated by 
fragmented rights, could result in powerful dead-hand control. Indeed, some 
programmers who want to maximize the use and longevity of their projects 
choose more permissive licenses instead of (or in addition to) the GPL for the 
express purpose of preserving the flexibility of subsequent generations of 
contributors.125 
Again, however, the problem seems less a consequence of the GPL than of 
the law of copyright, which gives copyright holders rights that last long into the 
future, controlling how people may use copies of creative works they have 
acquired and often dividing rights among many separate contributors.126 
Without the GPL, the commercial software developer who wanted to rescue the 
obsolete software would have to negotiate with each copyright holder before 
distributing copies of it; the GPL provides the additional option of avoiding 
negotiations by staying within the license terms. 
There are, however, at least two ways in which the operation of the GPL, 
Creative Commons licenses, and other cultural conservation easements may in 
practice exacerbate the problem of the future. First, the open and accessible 
 
 125. See, e.g., Open Source Applications Foundation, Chandler Licensing Plan, 
http://www.osafoundation.org/Chandler_licensing_plan_4-2003.htm  (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) 
(explaining that the “Chandler” calendar software will be available under a commercial license in 
addition to the GPL because “[w]e want to encourage commercial use and distribution of Chandler 
since these activities may provide a wider market, additional functionality, more choices, and broader 
benefit for end users”). 
 126. This fragmentation of rights occurs, for example, when a copyright holder authorizes 
preparation of a derivative work. The resulting work cannot be copied without permission from both 
the original copyright holder and the owner of the subsequent contributions. Copyright does have some 
doctrines that consolidate rights, however.  Consider, for example, the work-for-hire doctrine.  17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (consolidating copyrights in an employer under certain circumstances). 
03__VAN HOUWELING.DOC 8/8/2007  9:16 AM 
Spring 2007] THE CONSTRUCTED COMMONS 47 
nature of GPL- and Creative Commons-licensed works makes them amenable 
to iterative collaboration by many independent individuals.  The participation 
of so many collaborators creates the risk that an intractable thicket of 
fragmented and overlapping copyrights will make revisiting the original license 
restrictions impossible.127 Although the problem is even worse in theory under 
standard copyright, it may be the case that few works governed by standard 
copyright have as many owners (who are often difficult to track down and 
negotiate with) as GPL and Creative Commons works often do. 
As it turns out, the organization that created and promotes the GPL—the 
Free Software Foundation—has adopted a strategy for its own software projects 
that may alleviate this fragmentation problem: the FSF encourages all 
contributors to assign copyright in their contributions to the Foundation.128 The 
FSF explains that this makes enforcement of the GPL easier; of course, it would 
also make it easier to re-license the software in light of unforeseen changed 
circumstances.129 Creative Commons has raised the possibility of addressing the 
problem of the future not by minimizing fragmentation, but by reducing 
transaction costs by embedding copyright-holder contact information into 
Creative Commons license documentation.130 These efforts illustrate a broader 
phenomenon, noted in the institutional law and economics literature, whereby 
the transaction-cost problems caused by fragmented property rights are 
addressed voluntarily by private actors or institutions.131 
Another potential problem of the future involves license incompatibility.132  
Both the GPL family of licenses and Creative Commons’ “share-alike” licenses 
 
 127. On the prospect of underuse of intellectual resources subject to fragmented ownership, see 
generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998). 
 128. See GNU Project, Frequently Asked Questions About the GNU GPL, http://www.gnu.org/ 
copyleft/gpl-faq.html#AssignCopyright (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). The following statement on the 
GNU Project’s website addresses the question why contributors to Free Software Foundation licensed 
programs are encouraged to assign their copyrights to the Free Software Foundation: 
Our lawyers have told us that to be in the best position to enforce the GPL in court against 
violators, we should keep the copyright status of the program as simple as possible. We do this 
by asking each contributor to either assign the copyright on his contribution to the FSF, or 
disclaim copyright on it and thus put it in the public domain. . . . If you want to make an effort 
to enforce the GPL on your program, it is probably a good idea for you to follow a similar 
policy. 
Id. 
 129. Elsewhere I have suggested, for somewhat different reasons, that trusted third parties could 
serve a role akin to land trusts in the conservation easement context by managing intellectual property 
rights. See Van Houweling, supra note 44. 
 130. See Lawrence Lessig, CC in Review: Lawrence Lessig on CC Licenses, 
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/5704 (Nov. 23, 2005, 12:48 PST). 
 131. See generally Merges, supra note 3, at 189 (“Private action may offset some of the effects of an 
anticommons, making it less necessary to act on the normative agenda of anticommons theory, an 
agenda that involves restricting property rights and carries obvious risks and costs.”); Robert Merges, 
Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1864–67 
(2000). 
 132. See generally Elkin-Koren, supra note 16, at 412–14 (describing how “[t]he absence of 
standardization may lead to inconsistencies and incompatibilites between different free-content 
contracts”). 
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raise the specter of license incompatibility by requiring that derivative works 
prepared by the licensee be licensed under the same terms as the licensed 
work.133  That means that derivatives based upon GPL-licensed software can 
only be licensed under the GPL; other licenses—including other licenses that 
similarly seek to promote the model of open and non-proprietary software 
development—are incompatible.134  As for Creative Commons, no two share-
alike works can be combined into a new derivative work unless the terms of 
their respective licenses match.  This causes incompatibility even within the 
Creative Commons system, which offers licensors the choice of different (non-
matching) share-alike licenses.135 And there are many other non-Creative 
Commons licensing possibilities that are similarly incompatible with Creative 
Commons share-alike licenses.  Again, in theory these incompatibilities pose no 
more difficulty than the baseline of copyright, which allows no unauthorized 
derivative works at all.136 But the numerosity of licensors involved in 
collaborative CC- and GPL-licensed works—and the resulting transaction 
costs—may make this frustrating form of dead-hand control especially powerful 
in practice. 
VI 
CONCLUSION: COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL CONSERVATION 
Conservation easements and other types of novel servitudes are 
controversial in part because they upset settled assumptions about what it 
means to possess and own land. Purchasers of servitude-encumbered land may 
thus be unfairly surprised to learn about limits and conditions on their rights. 
This concern with notice has been alleviated to some extent by the advent of 
land-recording systems, but another concern remains—that servitudes will limit 
the autonomy of future generations and constrain their land use choices in ways 
that no longer seem desirable in light of changed circumstances. 
 
 133. See discussion infra notes 42 & 53 and accompanying text. 
 134. See ROSEN, supra note 45, at 246–47 (“The GPL license is widely considered to be the most 
restrictive in this respect. . . . Derivative works of contributions submitted under the GPL must be 
distributed under the GPL, and you can’t add any further restrictions.  Once a chain of title is started 
for a contribution under the GPL, the GPL is the only license that can be used for subsequent 
derivative works.”); id. at 252 (“For some of us, the problem of combining software under different 
licenses into derivative works is a frustration.  License incompatibilities prevent software from being 
freely used and combined.  And with the proliferation of open source licenses, the problem is getting 
worse, not better.”). 
 135. Zachary Katz describes conflict in detail. Katz, supra note 94, at 401–02; see also Elkin-Koren, 
supra note 16, at 413–14. 
 136. See Katz, supra note 94, at 409 n.41 (“Compared to the copyright default . . . CC licenses enable 
a tremendous amount of re-creation that would not otherwise occur. Any unforeseen drag on future 
creation is best seen as a small though potentially significant counter-effect of the CC licenses. 
Moreover, this effect can be partially overcome by would-be licensees negotiating with copyright 
holders for uses unauthorized by CC licenses. This effect is thus particularly likely to occur only where 
transaction costs prevent individual negotiations from occurring, that is, where a large number of 
would-be creators of derivative works each seek to use content from multiple previous creators who 
released their works under different CC licenses.”). 
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Cultural analogs to conservation easements have begun to trigger similar 
controversy and criticism. But there is a fundamental difference between 
conservation easements that constrain real property and cultural conservation 
easements that constrain copyrighted works in the way that the GPL and 
Creative Commons licenses do. Real property is characterized by background 
assumptions about the rights that come with ownership of land—including 
rights to use and to exclude; conservation easements and other servitudes are 
potentially confusing and constraining because they limit those rights. When the 
relevant background law is copyright, by contrast, the default assumption is 
that—insufficient notice notwithstanding—ownership of a book or a piece of 
software does not necessarily entail unlimited rights to use the creative work 
embodied in it, nor to exclude others from using it. Cultural conservation 
easements, therefore, generally alleviate confusion and liberate users of cultural 
works, vis à vis the default of copyright. 
Nonetheless, the lessons that emerge from the conservation easement 
movement and from longstanding debates about servitudes and other novel 
property forms can usefully shape cultural conservation easements by stressing 
the importance of clear notice and by highlighting the dangers to future 
flexibility posed by fragmented and incompatible property rights. More 
importantly, however, these lessons might inform copyright policy itself by 
reminding us of the costs imposed by a system that creates property rights 
without a mechanism for ensuring notice of those rights and that preserves 
those rights long into the future, across boundaries of space and time that can 
make voluntary negotiation difficult. 
There are some signs that copyright policy makers are beginning to grapple 
with these costs. The Copyright Office’s 2006 Report on Orphan Works 
recognizes that copyright can unduly constrain desirable uses of creative works 
because of transaction costs and notice problems. The Report observes that “a 
productive and beneficial use” of a copyrighted work can be forestalled “not 
because the copyright owner has asserted his exclusive rights in the work, or 
because the user and owner cannot agree on the terms of a license—but merely 
because the user cannot locate the owner.”137 The Report thus acknowledges 
that the problems traditionally associated with conservation easements and 
other unconventional servitudes—namely, the problems of assuring notice, 
minimizing information costs, and retaining flexibility for future generations to 
make their own choices about resource exploitation—are also problems for 
copyright. Cultural conservation easements should be informed by an 
awareness of these problems and structured to minimize them. On the whole, 
however, these innovative mechanisms for constructing an information 
commons help to solve—not exacerbate—the problems that copyright law 
causes. The persistence of those problems suggests the continued need for 
 
 137. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 114, at 15. 
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cultural environmentalism through copyright reform in addition to voluntary 
efforts at cultural conservation. 
